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FLAT BROKE AND BUSTED, BUT CAN I
KEEP MY DOMAIN NAME? DOMAIN
NAME PROPERTY INTERESTS IN THE
FIRST, FIFTH, AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS
I. INTRODUCTION

In April 2000, the Virginia Supreme Court issued an opinion that has become
a cornerstone in the law governing domain names. In Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro International,Inc. the court ruled that a creditor could not reach an Internet
domain name through a garnishment proceeding because a domain name is too
inextricably linked to a contract for services. Ultimately, the court reasoned that
a domain name cannot exist "separate from its respective service that created it
and that maintains its continued viability."2 The decision sparked a flurry of
scholarly commentary and debate concerning whether other jurisdictions would
follow the Virginia approach and the ruling's effect on other areas of the law
involving domain names.3 Most notably, commentators have considered Umbro
with respect to whether a creditor can use a domain name as a security interest
under UCC Revised Article 94 and whether a domain name 5should be considered
an asset of the debtor's estate in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In their analyses, however, these commentators have largely overlooked an
interesting portion of the Umbro opinion in which the Virginia Supreme Court
hinted that the First and Fifth Circuits might have decided the issue differently.

1 529 S.E.2d 80, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738 (Va. 2000).
Id at 87.

2

E.g., Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Resrtar.com: Identji'ng Securing andMaximi~qng the
Liquidation of Cber-Assets in Bankrupty Proceedings,8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 255, 273-80 (2000);
Brent R. Cohen & Thomas D. Laue, Acquiring and Enforcing Securip Interests in CyberrpaceAssets, 10 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 423, 429-30 (2001); Francis G. Conrad, Dot.coms in Bankrupty Valuations under
Title 11 or www.snipehunt in the dark.notrorg/noassets.com,9 AM. BANKR. INST. L REV. 417, 430-31
(2001); William H. Kiekhofer, III &Jeffrey C. Selman, BankruptgTandLicensing,in PLI's PATENT AND
HIGH TECHNOLOGY LICENSING at 279,337-41 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary

Property Course Handbook Series No. 652, May 2001);Johnathan Krisko, U.C.C.RtrisedArice 9:
Can Domain Names ProvideSecuriyforNew Economy Businesses?,79 N.C. L. REV. 1178,1185-86 (2001);
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, CyberproperyandJudidalDissonance:The Troubk with DomainName Classification,
10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 183, 199-204 (2001); Keith Shapiro, Dolcom Bankruptdes, Address Before

the American Bankruptcy Institute Sixth Annual Rocky Mountain Bankruptcy Conference (Feb. 810, 2001), in WL 020801 ABI-CLE 89.
' See, e.g., Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 433-35; Kiekhofer & Selman, supra note 3, at 333-45;
Krisko, spra note 3, at 1186.
s See, e.g., Chertok & Agin, supranote 3, at 273-76; Shapiro, supranote 3.
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Although the Umbro court insisted that a domain name is too "inextricably bound
to the domain name services" and thus indistinguishable as a property interest
separate from the contracted services, the court went on to note that "at least two
jurisdictions have made such a similar distinction with regard to telephone
numbers." 6 If the Umbro court is correct in its assessment, then it stands to
reason that those two jurisdictions might accept a domain name/telephone
number analogy and therefore distinguish a domain name as a property interest
separate from the services provided under the registration agreement.
The two jurisdictions to which the Umbro court referred are the First and Fifth
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit, said the Umbro court, recognized a property interest
in telephone numbers in GeorgiaPower Company v. Security Investment Properties,Inc.7
According to the Umbro court, Security Investment stands for the proposition that
"for a business,... telephone numbers constitute a unique property interest, the
value ofwhich increases as the number becomes widely known."' Because Security
Investmentwas decided before the Fifth Circuit split, this assessment by the Umbro
court also should apply to the Eleventh Circuit.
The Umbra court based its conclusion that the First Circuit would hold
likewise on one First Circuit case, Darman v.MetropolitanAlarm Corporation.' The
Umbro opinion devotes little time to Darman; it merely cites the case and
summarizes it, saying that it "approv[ed] [the] sale of telephone numbers in order
to increase [the] value of [a] bankruptcy estate and not[ed] [a] distinction between
'a subscriber's rights derived from a contract for telephone service and a
subscriber's possible claim to a possessory interest in the telephone number.' ""
As of the date of this writing, neither the First, Fifth, nor Eleventh Circuits
have had a reported case involving the property status of Internet domain names
in the context of a bankruptcy or proceeding in any other context. Thus, while
the Umbra opinion hints at how those Circuits would decide such a case, real
uncertainty exists about how those courts actually would approach the issue. Still,
what is certain is the likelihood that if the issue arises in any of those three
jurisdictions, then one party would surely argue, as Umbro did, that domain
names are analogous to telephone numbers and, therefore, that Security Investment
or Darman should control.
If and when a party advances this argument in the First, Fifth, or Eleventh
Circuit, the court must complete a two-part inquiry. First, the court must
529 S.E.2d at 87.
559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977).
Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80,87,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738,
1744 (Va. 2000) (quoting Georgia Power Co. v. Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir.
6

1977)).

9 528 F.2d 908 (1st Cit. 1976).

"I Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 87 (quoting Darman, 528 F.2d at 910 n.1).
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determine whether the Umbro opinion's assessment of the precedential value of
Securi6y Investment and Darman is accurate. In other words, the court must decide
whether those two cases actually stand for the proposition that a telephone
number can be subject to a possessory property interest. Moreover, even if those
cases posit that proposition, the court must examine Securiylnvestmentand Darman
to determine whether they establish limitations on the circumstances in which
such a property interest exists.
After determining whether and when Darman and Securiy Investment recognize
a property interest in telephone numbers, a court governed by the precedent of
either case next would have to determine whether that property interest would,
or should, apply to domain names as well as telephone numbers. In addressing
new legal issues presented by Internet-related technologies, courts constantly and
consciously must choose whether to apply established legal doctrine to these new
technologies or to create wholly new legal doctrine to deal with the unique issues
presented by the Internet." This truism certainly applies to any consideration of
property interests in domain names. Thus, courts bound by Security Investment and
Darman must determine whether domain names are similar enough to telephone
numbers that they should be treated in like manner when considering the
existence of a possessory property interest. Making this determination requires
consideration of the domain name/telephone number analogy in general terms
and examination of the factors and policy concerns which the Security Investment
and Darman courts set forth in their analyses.
Because a First, Fifth, or Eleventh Circuit court addressing the issue of
domain name property interests would likely go through some form of the twopart inquiry previously described, this Note undertakes that same inquiry to
ascertain how those courts would, or should, decide the issue. First, this Note
presents general information on the Internet, domain names, and the domain
name registration process. It also discusses Umbro, as it remains a leading case
regarding the property status of domain names. Next, this Note examines the
accuracy of Umbro's assessments of First and Fifth Circuit precedent with respect
to property interests in telephone numbers. As will be explained, the Umbro
assessment of First and Fifth Circuit precedent greatly misconstrues the actual
holdings of Security Investment and Darman. Unfortunately though, only one
published article has addressed the Umbro court's characterization of Security
Investment, and that commentator seems to have accepted at face value Umbro's

" Paul H. Arne, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Developing Law of the Intemet, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE at 9,16-19 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. 416, Sept. 1995).
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misappraisal of the Fifth Circuit's stance on the issue. 2 Further, no published
article has contemplated Umbro's assessment of Darman.
After explaining the First and Fifth Circuit approaches to property interests
in telephone numbers, this Note considers the domain name/telephone number
analogy to determine whether and how Darman and Security Investments might be
applied to domain names. Several cases have discussed this domain name/
telephone number analogy,' 3 and while a handful of publications have pondered
the analogy in passing, 4 none have done so within the context of the Fifth and
First Circuits' specific reasons for holding that a telephone number can be subject
to a possessory property interest.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE INTERNET AND DOMAIN NAMES

Before discussing Umbro and the Fifth and First Circuit cases on property
rights in telephone numbers, the complexities of the Internet and domain names
must be addressed to the extent that such an understanding is relevant to the
discussion at hand. The history of the Internet has been retold so many times in
law reviews and other publications that it has, according to some, entered the
realm of "economic folklore."'" Therefore, this Note will devote little time to that
same task except to emphasize a few of the more important facts of the Internet's
origin and evolution.
A product of the Cold War, the Internet, originally called ARPAnet (Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network) started life as the brainchild of the
Department of Defense, which began funding its development in 1969."6 By the
early 1980s, the Internet had strayed from its purely military research initiatives,
and the National Science Foundation had largely taken over the job of funding its
continued existence.' 7 The Internet did not veer from its research/scientific bent

12 See Chertok & Agin, supra note 3, at 278-79 (claiming that Securtit Investment is consistent with
two recent decisions recognizing a domain name as a property right).
13 For examples of cases that have addressed the similarities between telephone numbers and

domain names, see Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-85 (2d Cir. 2000);
Panavi'onInt%LP.v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,1325,46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511,1522 (9th Cir. 1998);
Sallen v. CorinthiansLicentiamentosLTDA, 273 F.3d 14,19,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941,1949 (1st Cit.
1991); Dorer v. Airl, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,957-58,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
14 See, e.g., Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 433.
IsId at 423.
16 G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 31-32 (1995).
17 Id at 32.
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until the second half of the nineties. During that time, use of the Internet,
especially personal and home use, exploded.'" The exponential growth of Internet
use resulted largely from the World Wide Web application, which allows users to
connect to the Internet via web browsers such as Microsoft Explorer or Netscape
Navigator. 9
Navigation within the cyber-world is enabled by what essentially functions as
a high-tech address system. In the cyber-world, addresses of websites are known
as URLs (uniform resource locators).2' For example, http://www.uga.edu is the
URL for the University of Georgia homepage. The first portion of this particular
address, "http," identifies the scheme or transfer protocol. In particular, "http"
stands for "hypertext transfer protocol," which is the most common scheme for
URLs. 2' Following the two
forward slashes is the "key component of a website's
22
URL"-its domain name.
In reality, computers connected to the Internet do not locate websites using
the domain names that people use. Instead, networked computers use Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses to locate websites. An IP address is a string of four
numbers (often with each containing a varying number of digits) each separated
by a period. 23 For example, 131.96.160.50 is the IP address for one of the
University System of Georgia's library servers. 24 "Because people remember
names better than numbers, a conversion system called the Domain Name System
('DNS') is used to translate the Web addresses used by people into the numeric
IP addresses used by the Network." 2
According to some commentators, a domain name functions as a combination
of a trademark, address, and telephone number all rolled into one. 26 In substance,
a domain name has at least two parts, each separated by a dot. In its simplest
form, a domain name consists of a "top-level" domain "preceded by a 'second
level' domain name which serves as an individual identifier. '2 7 Some refer to the
top level domain name as a generic Top Level Domain (gTLD).2' Thus, for

18

Navin Katyal, The Domain Name Registration .BIZness: Are We Being 'gulled Over" on the

InformationSuper Highwa?,24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 241,248 (2002).
"9Milton Mueller, ICA.NN andIntenet Governance."Sorting through the Debris of 'Self-Regulation, Vol.
1, No. 6 INFO 497, 500 (1999).
20Allison, supra note 16, at 60.
21 Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 425.
2 Kiekhofer & Selman, spra note 3, at 333.
2 Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 425.
24 See Z39.50 Access Parametersfor GIL Libraries,at http://gil.usg.edu/html/z3950-server.html
(last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
s Cohen & Laue, spranote 3, at 425.
2 Adam Chase, A Primeron Recent Domain Name Disputes, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 4 (1998).
Kiekhofer & Selman, supra note 3, at 333.
2 E.g., David H. Bernstein, The A4habet Soup of Domain Name Dispute Rtsolumion: The UDRP and
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example, in "uga.edu" the top-level domain is ".edu" and the second-level domain
name is "uga." Originally, only five generic top-level domain names existed:
.com, .org., .gov, .edu, and .net. Two others, .mil and .int, were later added. The
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) recently
expanded the list to include seven more: ".aero (for the aviation industry), .biz
(for businesses), coop (for cooperative groups), .info (for information), museum
(for museums), .name (for personal and character names), and .pro (for
professionals .. .).,,21 "Additional top level domains may indicate the country of
origin. For example, ',uk' represents the United Kingdom and '.jp' represents
30
Japan."
Because every domain name must be unique, a rather lucrative market for
domain names has arisen, particularly in the case of generic domain names, where
trademark protection does not prevent the registration of the name by anyone.
"For example, www.wallstreet.com reportedly sold for $1 million and
www.drugs.com sold for over $800,000. ' '31 The market for generic domain names
is essentially a race of the swiftest-he who registers the name first is he who will
reap the rewards. The race to register has been so competitive that relatively few
valuable .com (the most popular gTLD) domain names remain available. 32 Thus,
a large demand now exists for valuable second level domain names within other
top-level domains. Since few top-level domain names exist though, and since
each top-level domain has restrictions placed on its use (i.e., .museum must be
used for museums, .aero must be used by the aviation industry, etc.), many
businesses face a real scarcity of alternatives to the .com gTLD.3
In an interesting display of entrepreneurship, at least three countries have
started selling and registering domain names within their countries' top-level
domains to meet the demand for alternative gTLDs. For example, Tuvalu, whose
top-level domain is .tv, has sold domain names within the .tv domain with initial
registration fees starting at $100,000. The CoCos Keeling Islands, whose toplevel domain is .cc, has jumped into the game as well. The most valuable .cc

ACPA, in PLI's EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 251,255 (PLI

Patents, Copyrights, Trademark, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 716, Sept. 26-

27, 2002).
' Meichelle R. MacGregor, What's in a Name: Domain Names and Trademarksin the New Meda
Environment,in REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COMPANY: GUIDING YOUR CLIENTS THROUGH
A CHANGING ECONOMY 2002 at 373, 382 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary

Property Course Handbook Series No. 686,Jan. 2002).
0 Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 426.
3' Richard D. Harroch, LegalIssuesAssodatedwith the Creationand Operationof Web Sites, in FOURTH
ANNUAL INTERNETLAW INSTITUTE at 537,548 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 610,June 2000).
32 Katyal, supra note 18, at 257-58.
3 Id
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domain name, www.beauty.cc, sold for $1 million.34 The Northern Mariana
Islands has taken a slightly different approach. Saipan DataCom, Inc. contracted
with the Northern Mariana Islands, whose top-level domain is .mp, to acquire the
right to become a registrar for domain names in the .mp domain. This business
venture resulted in MarketPlace Domain, Inc., a domain registrar that now
competes with VeriSign, the most popular registrar of domain names.3" Thus, for
many, acquiring and selling domain names has become an expensive venture that
can produce lucrative rewards nearly overnight.
B. THE REGISTRATION PROCESS

1. ICAAN and the Antifybersquatting ConsumerProtectionAct. How the domain
name game is played has changed as the registration process has evolved over the
last decade. In recent years, much of this change has been effected through the
creation of ICANN and the passage of federal legislation. In 1992, Network
Solutions, Inc. (NS1)36 outbid competitors for designation by the National Science
Foundation as the sole registrar of domain names in the .com, .edu, .gov, .org, and
.net gTLDs." This virtual monopoly continued until the original contract
between the National Science Foundation and NSI expired in 1998.38 Shortly
before the contract's expiration, the Clinton administration pushed for the
creation of an international organization to govern domain name registration.39
These efforts resultedin ICANN-the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers.' "As things currently stand, ICANN accredits those companies
who wish to act as domain name registrars. [Verisign] continues to run the
registry for .com, .net, and .org names, but shares access to Route Server A with
'
Route Server A contains the registry of the most
other registrars for a fee."41
popular domain names and acts as a sort of card catalogue for those domain

34Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over Inherent# Distinctive
Trademarks-The E-Brang I-Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power?,50 AM. U. L. REV.
937, 957 (2001).
31 Cohen & Laue, spra note 3, at 426-27.
' NSI is now known as VeriSign. Zohar Efroni, TheAntibersquattingConsumerProtectionAct and
Shopping?,26 COLUM.-VLA
the Uniform DiputeResolution Poliy: New OpportunitiesforlnternationalForum
J.L. & ARTS 335, 362 (2003).
s Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Uniform DomainNameDisuteResolutionPoiff,15 BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 289, 293 (2000).
38 Katyal, spra note 18, at 248 n.32.
0 Adam Silberlight, Comment, WWW. How to be a Masterof Your Domain.com: A Look at the
Asignment of Internet Domain Names under FederalTrademark laws,FederalCase Law andBgyond, 10 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 271 n.255 (2000).
0 Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 427-28.
41 Id at 428.
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names. 2 As of the date of this writing, ICANN has accredited over one hundred
domain name registrars.43 The Bush administration, however, has expressed
disappointment in ICANN's less than hoped for achievements.' Still, ICANN
will continue in its current capacity at least until the end of September 2003 based
on the5 U.S. government's recent renewal of its contract with ICANN for another
4
year.
Changes in the registration process also have come in the form of federal
legislation. In 1999, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act as an amendment to section 43 of the Lanham Act.' Congress
intended the legislation "to protect companies against persons or entities that
acquire domain names for the purpose of extorting payment for the purchase of
these names from trademark owners and/or for trading on the brand recognition
and good will of an existing mark."' 7 Since the Act aims to affect only "true"
cybersquatters, it protects individuals from only those squatters who register
domain names in bad faith. s
The Act allows a party injured by another's squatting of a domain name to
commence an in rem civil proceeding.' 9 Thus, a successful litigant can prompt the
court to seize the domain name by forcing the registrar "to deposit with the Court
documents sufficient to establish the Court's control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain name."50 Still, only a small
fraction of domain names are also registered or protected trademarks,51 and
therefore, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act does not affect the
squatting5 2 and trading of generic domain names, which are often the most
valuable.

42

Id at 426.

43 Jennifer S. Cook, Comment, Enforcing the Federal Dilution Trademark Act of 1995 and the

AntigybersquatingAct of 1999: JudicalDisrttionAdvised, 1 HOuS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 224, 228 (2001).
" Jim Wagner, DoC Set to Renew Vows with ICA1NN, Internetnews.com, at http://www.
Internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/1465601 (Sept. 18, 2002).
45 Id
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
47 Chertok & Agin, supra note 3, at 274, 275.
41 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 15:91 (2002).
9 Seegeneralb Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1121 (E.D. Va. 2000); Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484,61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1323 (E.D. Va. 2001).
so Chertok & Agin, mupra note 3, at 275 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000)).
s Krisko, supra note 3, at 1183.
52 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Sokdtude: IntellectualPrperyLaw, 1900-2000, 88 CAL.

L. REv. 2187, 2215 (2000).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss1/11

8

Blackerby: Flat Broke and Busted, But Can I Keep My Domain Name? Domain Name

20031

FLAT BROKE AND BUSTED

2. NSI, VeriSign, and the Role of the Registrar. NSI was originally the only

registrar of domain names, 3 and today it remains the registrar (under the name
VeriSign) for the most common gTLDs.' VeriSign originally operated only as
an identifier of secure websites and played no role in the actual registration
process. Thus, any site that met VeriSign's standards for security of information
could display a VeriSign Secure Site symbol."5 In 1999, VeriSign and NSI
announced an agreement whereby NSI would display the VeriSign security
symbols on its dot corn directory next to those sites which had met VeriSign's
security requirements. 6 Under the agreement, a website not listed could apply for
a digital certificate through VeriSign or NSI. s7 Thus, under the terms of the April
1999 agreement, NSI assumed the functions of VeriSign yet retained its name.
Not until March of the following year, 2000, did VeriSign and NSI take the crucial
steps toward the NSI name change. On March 7, 2000, VeriSign entered into an
agreement to buy out NSI. As a result of the buyout, VeriSign replaced NSI on
the NASDAQ-100 list and VeriSign now offers all of the services previously
offered by NSI. s8
Even though ICANN has accredited other domain name registrars, 9 VeriSign
remains the most popular registrant of domain names.' Thus, examination of
VeriSign's registration process provides a sufficient understanding of the
registrar's role in registering and maintaining domain names. VeriSign performs
two important functions for domain name registrants. First, "it screens domain
name applications against its data base to prevent duplication.""' This step in the
registration process begins online at the company's home page. 2 The registrant
submits the desired domain, and then VeriSign performs a search of all currently
registered domain names in the VeriSign directory.63 If the desired name is

' To be precise, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) was actually the first
registrar of domain names, and it remained the only registrar until 1992 when NSI outbid
competitors for the job. PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 389, 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
s' See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
's Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa & Emerson H. Tiller, Customer Trust in VirtualEnvironments: A Managerial
Perspective, 81 B.U. L. REv. 665, 682 (2001).
s Maura Ginty, VriSign, NSI Ink dot corn Agreement, Internetnews.com, at http://www.
Internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/101041 (Apr. 19, 1999).
7 Id

8 VeriSign to RtplaNSIonNASDAQ-100 Index, Intemetnews.com, athttp://dc.lntemet.com/
news/article.php/386181 Oune 2, 2000).
s9 See supranotes 16-17 and accompanying text.
0 Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 426.
6 Id
62 VeriSgn, at http://www.verisign.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
63 At least one other registrar, MarketPlace Domain Inc., does not allow potential registrars to
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available, the registrant may register the name for a minimum of one year for $35
or a maximum of ten years for $150. 64 The second function of VeriSign and
other registrars in the registration process is65that of linking domain server IP
numbers with their respective domain names.
C. OVERVIEW OF NSI V. UMBRO

The factual background of the seminal case of Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro
International,Inc.66 actually begins with Umbro International,Inc. v. 3263851 Canada,
Inc.67 There, Umbro, maker of soccer apparel, was solicited by a Canadian
corporation owned by James Tombas. Tombas' corporation mainly dealt in the
distribution of pornography over the Intemet,' but Tombas, through the
corporation, had also registered a number of domain names with NSI for the
purpose of cybersquatting in the most classic of fashions. One victim of Tombas'
cybersquatting turned out to be Umbro. Though Umbro had registered its name
as a trademark approximately ten years earlier, Tombas registered the name
"umbro.com" with NSI and then faxed Umbro a "demand letter" requesting that
the company pay Tombas $50,000, give $50,000 to an Internet charity, and give
Tombas a lifetime supply of Umbro merchandise in return for the domain
name.69 Umbro sued Tombas' corporation in the South Carolina District Court
for trademark infringement and won a default judgment. Tombas' corporation
was enjoined from any further use of the "Umbro" mark, was directed to
relinquish all interest in the domain name, and was ordered to pay Umbro
$23,489.98 in reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses."0 After winning its South
Carolina federal suit against Tombas' corporation and obtaining a Certificate of
Registration from another South Carolina District Court, Umbro turned its
attention to NSI, the registrar of "umbro.com." Umbro went to Virginia, where
NSI was headquartered, and obtained a writ offierifadaswhich was subsequently
served on NSI. 7t Umbro then instituted a garnishment proceeding seeking a

search its database of domain names for available names. This is aimed at reducing cybersquatting.
Note also that the MarketPlace registrant of a non-generic domain name must also hold a trademark
in the name. Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 426 (2001).
" Network Solutions, at http://www.netsolcom (last visited Sept. 3, 2003).
65 Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 426.

529 S.E.2d 80, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738 (Va. 2000).
48 Va. Cir. 139, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (1999).
See id at 1790 (explaining how Tombas' corporation operated several websites such as
"picsofchics.com," "sexxx.com," "pomplaza.com," and "slutpix.com").
69 Id at 1787.
7) Id at 1786.
71 One should note that VeriSign, which acquired NSI in 2000, isa California-based corporation.
'6
67
61

Christopher Saunders & Michael Singer, Veriign Settles Marketing Lawsuit, Intemetnews.com, at
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judicial sale of Tombas' corporation's domain names to satisfy Umbro's
judgment. Specifically, Umbro sought to garnish thirty-eight domain names that
Tombas' corporation had allegedly registered with NSI.72 NSI, however,
answered that it had no "money or garnishable property of the Judgment
Debtor.""
In December 1998, the Virginia Circuit Court held a hearing to determine
whether NSI had cause not to deposit the domain names into the registry of the
court. NSI claimed that the court should characterize the domain names sought
to be garnished as "standardized, executory service contracts" or "domain name
registration agreements." 74 The court pointed out that NSI had, at that time,
registered 3.5 million domain names and that ninety percent of these registration
applications had involved no human intervention. s Since NSI had registered over
three million domain names on a completely electronic basis, the court had little
patience with NSI's claim that the garnishment would force it to perform
contractual services for someone with whom it had not entered into a contract;
NSI essentially exercised no discretion over whom it registered.76
The circuit court further buttressed this argument by noting that the Patent
Office performs certain services in issuing a patent, but a patent still can be
garnished. "The fact that this form of intellectual property results from a service
that NSI provides does not (as NSI argues) preclude the property from
garnishment any more than the service provided by the Patent Office in issuing
a patent immunizes patents from garnishment."77 Thus, the circuit court
disagreed with NSI and held that NSI had to deposit the domain names into the
court's registry in order to be auctioned by the sheriff.7"
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, NSI reasserted the argument it had
made before the circuit court, claiming that the circuit court had wrongly
concluded that a domain name could be considered subject to a possessory
property interest separate from the services called for by the registration

http://www.Internetnews.com/IAR/article.php/1478091 (Oct. 7, 2002). Since VeriSign remains
the most popular domain name registrar and this author is unaware of any Virginia-based ICANNaccredited registrars, the precedential importance of Umbra has become diminished.
72 Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 81.
' 3263851 Canada,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
7
Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 81.
75 3263851 Canada,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
76Id Note that part of the court's impatience with this argument resulted from the fact that
many of Tombas' corporation's registered domain names were intended to be sites for the
distribution and/or exhibition of pornography. That NSI had registered names for a pornographer
was yet another factor leading the court to conclude that NSI exercised little or no discretion over
with whom it entered into registration contracts.
7 Id at 1789-90.
78Id
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agreement.79 In response, Umbro posited that since NSI assigned domain names
on a first-come, first-serve basis and the registrant acquired the right to exclusive
use of the domain names for two years, such exclusive use of the domain names
should be considered as intangible property interests subject to garnishment. °
Interestingly, NSI did not deny that a domain name is a form of intangible
property. Moreover, the court neither agreed nor disagreed with the circuit's
court's characterization of domain names as a "form of intellectual property."'
The court skirted the issue by declaring that regardless of the registrant's possible
rights in the exclusive use of the domain name, "those rights do not exist separate
and apart from NSI's services that make the domain names operational Internet
addresses."' 2 Thus, the court took into consideration the bifurcated nature of the
services of a registrar-screening applicants to avoid the duplication of names and
83
linking domain server IP numbers with their respective domain names.
Focusing on the second of these duties, the court reasoned that because use of
the domain name depends upon the registrar's maintenance of the link between
the IP number and the domain name, the registration of a domain name should
be characterized as a contract for services.84
Under this "contract for services" approach to domain names, the registrant
pays the registrar to maintain an IP number/domain name link and to prevent
other would-be registrants from using the same domain name. The court feared
that allowing garnishment of a domain name registrar's services would open the
door for garnishment of "practically any service." ' Of special concern was the
court's fear that a contrary ruling would allow garnishment of corporate names.8 6
Interestingly, the Virginia Supreme Court never directly responded to the
circuit court's focus on the lack of discretion during the registration process. Still,
on its face, that argument has some clear flaws. For example, simply because a
party has rarely exercised discretion in choosing with whom to contract, the court
should not force that party to enter into a services contract with anyone willing
to pay for them at a forced auction. The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the
line of reasoning accepted by the circuit court by relying upon the clearly
established rule in Virginia that "where the property is in the form of a contract

'9 Umbr, 529 S.E.2d at 85.

'0 Id at 85-86.
81Id at 86.
Id
a Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 426.
u Umbra, 529 S.E.2d at 86.
82

85

Id at 86-87.

See id (noting that corporate names are registered by the State Corporation Commission,
which disallows the use of indistinguishable corporate names by other entities).
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right, the judgment creditor does not 'step into the shoes' of the judgment debtor
and become a party to the contract.""7
III.

ANALYSIS

The emerging law of the Internet reveals a constant struggle between the
judicial tendency to apply traditional legal doctrine to new technologies and the
urge to carve out new legal principles for issues that are seemingly unique to the
Internet."s Thankfully for lawyers and judges, new Internet-related legal issues
sometimes fit neatly into old legal concepts; consider, for example, defamation.
Defamatory remarks can be as injurious when broadcast on the Internet as when
published in a newspaper. Thus, courts have had no trouble imposing liability for
false and malicious statements posted about a person on a web page. 9
Yet, sometimes trying to apply established legal doctrine to new Internetrelated issues is like trying to force a square peg into a round hole. As one
commentator has observed,
[a]ctivities in 'cyberspace' are often identical to those that have been
occurring elsewhere for a long time. In other ways, however, the
nature of the Internet technology, the ubiquitousness of the
medium, and the new forms of communication that are allowed by
the Internet make the application of existing statutory and common
law awkward at best.'
In situations of the latter type, the courts either must round the edges of the
square peg or cut a new, square hole. For instance, determining jurisdiction in an
Internet-defamation case has not fit neatly into established legal doctrine. Courts
have had to consider, for example, whether a defendant in New York who
publishes defamatory material on the Internet is subject to personal jurisdiction
in California. 9 Clearly, applying doctrines such as "minimum contacts" and
"stream of commerce" may make little sense in the Internet context. Courts,

Id at 88 (quoting a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; the
Virginia Supreme Court concluded, however, that the Fourth Circuit had correctly interpreted
Virginia case law).
88 Ame, .rupra note 11, at 18.
89 See generall Jay M. Zitter, Liabifiy of Internet Service ProviderforInteraetor E-MailDefamation, 84
A.L.R. 5TH 169, 177 (2000) ('The law of defamation... is applicable to the Internet in general. The
courts and legislatures have employed traditional defamation principles to regulate electronic and online defamation.").
0 Arne, supra note 11, at 13.
91 Jewish Defense Org., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611 (1999).
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therefore, have had to develop new legal formulae and doctrines, including
defining different categories of web pages and basing jurisdictional determinations
on the particular category of web page at issue.12 Thus, when traditional doctrines
do not answer new questions posed by the Internet, old theories must be
reshaped or new theories must be articulated. In this regard, domain names, like
a plethora of other Intemet-related issues, beg the question "whether new wine
can be poured into an old bottle."93 Answering each subtle legal question about
the nature of domain names requires fitting the qualities of domain names into
the features of established legal doctrines involving property, creditors and
debtors, securities, and a host of other areas of law.
As one of the first cases dealing directly with domain names in the context of
the law of creditors and debtors, Umbro exemplifies the process in which courts
participate when addressing new Internet-related issues. Though the court could
have given into the temptation of noting the unique features of domain names
and then establishing ambitious new legal doctrines to deal with them, the court
instead tried to work domain names into a web of already existing legal theories.94
In so doing, the court looked at the nature of the contract between a domain
name registrar and registrant in order to conclude that a domain name is
essentially a contract for services."5 Once the court fit domain names into the
pigeonhole of contracts for services, the court's ultimate holding came as no
surprise; the court only needed to apply the rule that contracts for services cannot
be garnished under Virginia law to reach its conclusion that Umbro could not
garnish the names registered with NSI. 6
The Umbro decision put to rest any uncertainty regarding how Virginia courts
will handle domain names in garnishment proceedings. By extension, the opinion
also will control the treatment of domain names in Chapter 7 bankruptcies arising
in Virginia.07 Still, Umbro raises as many questions about domain names in the

92 Seegenera/OZippoMfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1062 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (introducing a sliding scale that divided Internet defendants into three
categories); but see Rachael T. Krueger, TraditionalNotions of FairPlay and SubstantialJustice Lost in
Cyberpace: PersonalJunds&tonandOn- ine Defamatogy Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301,324 (2001)
(arguing that the Zippo sliding scale test was prematurely formulated and has lost favor among the
courts).
' United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535,535,33 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1978,1978 (D. Mass.
1994) (addressing the issue of copyright infringement achieved through the use of an electronic
bulletin board, the court noted the general difficulties in applying established legal concepts to the
new medium of the Internet).

' See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that the court avoided the issue of whether
domain names actually constitute intellectual property).
9'See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
9 Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 87-88.
' Generally, services contracts are not treated as assets of the debtor's estate for the purposes
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context of creditor/debtor law as it answers. The most obvious question is
whether other courts will agree with and follow Umbra. As of the date of this
writing, no cases directly addressing the issue have been reported. In one of the
few closely related cases, Kremen v.Cohen,9" a California district court held that a
domain name could not be the subject of a conversion suit. Still, the court there
did not follow Umbra; rather, the court issued a narrow holding and specifically
stated that Umbra did not apply.9 Ultimately, whether courts will follow Umbra
by concluding that domain name registration agreements are services contracts
must remain a matter of pure speculation for the time being.
Another and possibly more interesting question is whether courts that classify
domain name registration agreements as services contracts will also follow Umbr
by holding that domain names cannot be garnished by a creditor or liquidated by
a trustee in bankruptcy. In other words, a court in another jurisdiction might
agree with Umbra that a domain name is the product of a services contract but
might hold that the domain name can be treated as separate from the services
contract. The Umbra decision even hints at this possibility by acknowledging that
the Fifth and First Circuits made such a distinction between a telephone number
and the contract for telephone service."° In the court's own words:
Umbro attempts to draw a distinction between the judgment
debtor's contractual right to use the domain names ... and NSI's
services that... make those domain names operational Internet
addresses. We are not persuaded by Umbro's argument, although
at least two jurisdictions have made a similar distinction with regard
to telephone numbers."'

of a Chapter 7 liquidation or Chapter 12 reorganization bankruptcy. See Arnold M. Quittner,
Executory ContractsandLeases, in PLI's 24TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
& REORGANIZATION at 453,723 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No.
838, Apr. 11, 2002) (stating that "§ 365 concerning assumption or rejection of a contract does not
apply to a personal services contract in a bankruptcy case under chapter 7 or 11"). The Umbro
court's reasoning also makes clear that a court following the decision could not allow liquidation of
a debtor's domain name. At the forefront of the court's concerns is the notion that the registrar
should not be forced to provide services to a party with whom it has not chosen to contract. 529
S.E.2d at 86-87. Selling the domain name to a buyer during a Chapter 7 liquidation would, in the
same way, allow a third party with whom the registrar has not contracted to step into the shoes of
the registrant.
98 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
99 Id at 1173 n.2.
'0o529 S.E.2d at 87.

101id
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In support of its assertion that two other jurisdictions have made this
distinction with respect to telephone numbers and telephone services, the Umbro
court cited a case from the First Circuit and a case decided by the Fifth Circuit
before the circuit split.1" 2 By accepting the Umbro court's assessment of Fifth and
First Circuit authority with respect to propertyinterests in telephone numbers, the
possibility remains that three of the federal circuits (three rather than two because
the Fifth Circuit case was decided before the split) might accept the Umbro court's
conclusion that a domain name registration agreement is a services contract yet
still hold that a domain name can be considered subject to a possessory property
interest separate and distinct from the registration services contract.
To determine whether the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits might make the
same distinction between a domain name and the services provided by the
registrar that the Umbro court claims that the Fifth and First Circuit make
regarding telephone numbers, a two-part inquiry is required. First, the accuracy
of the Umbro court's characterizations of Fifth and First Circuit precedent
regarding telephone numbers must be examined. Second, if the Umbro court was
accurate in its assessments that those two Circuits have distinguished between
telephone numbers and domain names, the next inquiry would be whether the
First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit courts would, and should, give credence to the
argument that telephone numbers and domain names are so similar that they
merit like treatment at least within the context of garnishment and Chapter 7
liquidation proceedings. This, in turn, requires comparing the nature of telephone
numbers and services to those of domain names and the services of domain name
registrars. Moreover, even assuming that the domain name/telephone number
analogy is persuasive, the question remains as to whether the First, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits should extend their established precedent into the realm of
domain names or, instead, whether the courts and legislatures should formulate
new legal rules to address domain names in a manner different from their
treatment of telephone numbers.
A. POSSESSORY PROPERTY INTERESTS IN TELEPHONE NUMBERS IN THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT

In its effort to persuade the court to apply established legal doctrine to new
technologies, Umbro tried to distinguish the registrant's exclusive right to use a
domain name from the services provided by the registrar by pointing out that "at
least two jurisdictions have made a similar distinction with regard to telephone

102

Id at 87 (citing Ga. Power Co. v. Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977) and

Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1976)).
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numbers."1 °3 Moreover, Umbro argued that telephone numbers and domain
names are so similar that they should be treated in a similar vein." ° While that
argument will be addressed later in this analysis, the Umbr court did not
necessarily agree or disagree with the argument that similarities exist. The court
never had to directly address the issue because it flatly held that despite the
possible existence of similarities between telephone numbers and domain names,
both should be construed as contracts for services. In the court's words, "neither
one exists separate from its respective service that created it and that maintains
its continued viability."'0 5 In so holding, the Umbro court posited its fundamental
disagreement with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in GeoriaPowerCompanyv. Securit
Investment Properties,Inc. "
In its discussion of Securio Investment, the Umbra court characterized that case
as standing for the proposition that a business debtor has actual or constructive
possession of its telephone number sufficient for the bankruptcy court to exercise
jurisdiction over the number. The Umbr court, however, disagreed with this
proposition and held that telephone numbers and domain names were both too
interwoven with service contracts to be treated as distinct possessory property
4
interests1'
Contrary to the Umbro court's characterization of Securiy Investment,
however, the Fifth Circuit's approach to property interests in telephone numbers
is riddled with subtleties and not nearly as easily defined as the Umbro court
suggested. In fact, the Fifth Circuit did not hold that a telephone number is
subject to a possessory property interest in Securi!y Investment. Rather, in Securiy
Investment, the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor does not have a possessory property
interest in electrical service. 0 8
At issue in Securiy Investment was the bankruptcy court's ability to enjoin a
power company from discontinuing electrical service to two bankrupt debtors in
the absence of a deposit or surety bond for future payments. 9 Both debtors had
voluntarily filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions."' Subsequently, Georgia Power
threatened to discontinue service to the debtors unless it had assurance of future
Despite Georgia
payments in the form of either a deposit or surety bond.'
Power's argument that Georgia law allowed it to demand a deposit for twice the
amount of a customer's monthly bill, the bankruptcy court issued a preliminary,

103Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 87.
104 Id
105 Id

" 1d; Ga. Power Co. v. Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1977).
107529 S.E.2d at 87.

108559 F.2d at 1324-25.
109
Id.at 1323.
110 Id

III Id
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and later a permanent, injunction preventing Georgia Power from requiring a
deposit during the period of the debtors' Chapter 11 reorganizations." 2
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not have
jurisdiction to enjoin Georgia Power from requiring a deposit as a prerequisite to
continued electrical service." 3 In reaching that conclusion, the court first noted
that the bankruptcy court cannot exercise summary jurisdiction over property
unless the debtor or trustee has actual or constructive possession of the property;
in other words, the bankruptcy court has no power over property that is not part
of the debtor's estate."' Next, the court reasoned that a recipient of electrical
service has no possessory property interest in future electric service; therefore, the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Georgia Power from cutting off
electrical service in the absence of a deposit."'
Given this description of the issues atworkin Security Investment, understanding
why the Umbro court relied so heavily upon it in concluding that the Fifth Circuit
had held that a party can have a possessory property interest in a telephone
number is quite difficult. Indeed, the Umbro court is off target in relying on
Security Investment for its assessment of Fifth Circuit precedent; the holding of
Security Investment clearly does not extend to telephone companies threatening to
1
discontinue service. 16
Still, the Umbro court's focus on Security Investment was not completely
unwarranted since Security Investment does address telephone numbers in dicta.
The discussion of property interests in telephone numbers arose in Secuni'y
Investmentbecause the debtors made an argument based on In reFontainebleauHotel
Corporation,"7 the one Fifth Circuit case that actually held telephone numbers
subject to a possessory property interest. Fontainebleauinvolved the bankruptcy
of a hotel that had accumulated over $9,000 in unpaid bills by the time it filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11.1'8 After learning of the bankruptcy filing, the
South Central Bell Telephone Company gave the hotel two alternatives: pay the
outstanding debt and continue with the existing service (and, by extension, the
same telephone numbers) or begin with new service (and, hence, new numbers)." 9

112

Id

Ga. Power Co. v. Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id at 1324.
,,s Id at 1324-25.
n6 Seeid at 1324 ("The property interest in [telephone] numbers differs from a subscriber's rights
113

114

to the telephone utility's service, By contrast, the debtors in this case possess no indicia or adjunct
of the future electric service in issue analogous to [a debtor's possible property interest inj telephone
numbers.").
117 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).
us Id at 1057.
119

Id at 1058.
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In response, Fontainebleau sought help from the court in the form of a
temporary injunction (to last until a reorganization plan could20be submitted and
approved) in order to keep its then existing phone numbers.'
Fontainebleau received the relief it requested. 2 ' The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals first noted (as it also did in Security Investmen) that a bankruptcy court has
no jurisdiction over property that is not in the debtor's actual or constructive
possession.12 2 Unlike the Security Investment court's conclusion regarding property
rights in electrical service, however, the Fontainebleau court concluded that a
telephone number is the object of a possessory property interest.'
Although the Fontainebleaucourt did not clearly delineate its reasons for finding
a possessory property interest in telephone numbers, the court seems to have
considered three reasons in reaching that conclusion. First, the court noted that
the hotel had the right to use the numbers. 24 The court indicated that this should
be the predominant consideration in determining whether a possessory property
interest exists when it stated, "[r]ight of use is surely the most important attribute
of possession, and the hotel clearly had the right of use as to these telephone
".1..'25
numbers .
The second reason relied on by the Fontainebleaucourt draws upon one of the
purposes of Chapter 11 bankruptcy itself. Keeping in mind that the essential
purpose of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is "to restructure a business's finances so that
it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and
produce a return for its stockholders,"' 126 the court noted that "telephone numbers
are a valuable asset, just like the hotel's building or furniture.' 12 1 Thus,
"[p]rotecting use of the telephone numbers by the debtor clearly falls within that
responsibility [of preserving the wherewithal for maintaining the debtor's
business].' 2 On this point, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
bankruptcy court's determination that "the hotel's business would be substantially
impaired if it could not keep the present numbers."'2 9
The third and final justification posited by the court is based on what might
be deemed a labor theory approach. The Fontainebleaucourt noted that "[k]eeping

"0Id at 1058.
121 Id

12 In reFontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1058 (5th Cit. 1975).
"3

Ia at 1059.

124Id
125 Id

12 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6179-80.
12? In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cit. 1975).
129Id
'29

d at 1058.
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the present numbers is important to the hotel because it has invested substantial
sums in advertising that lists the numbers.""13 This emphasis on advertising that
used the numbers indicates the court's interest in protecting the labor expended
to give the numbers value rather than the numbers themselves. A concern for
protecting value added by one's labor seems strongly reminiscent of Locke's labor
theory arguments. According to Locke,
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.
It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it
in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it that excludes the
common right of other Men.'
Based on its justifications, the Fontainebleaucourt did not necessarily intend to
lay down a blanket rule about property interests in telephone numbers. Rather,
the Fontainebkauholding is limited to situations in which (1) a debtor has a present
right to use the number; (2) he has expended energy in adding value to the
number; and (3) considering the number as a property interest would further the
Chapter 11 goal of encouraging the future success of a bankrupt enterprise.
The Umbro court's characterization of the Fifth Circuit approach to phone
numbers, therefore, is flawed for two reasons. First, the Umbra court did not cite
or discuss Fontainebkau,which was the sole Fifth Circuit case that actually held
that a possessory property interest exists in telephone numbers. Instead, the
court looked only to Security Investment, a case not even involving telephone
numbers. The Security Investment court had distinguished Security Investment from
Fontainebleau(primarily on the very grounds that Security Investmentdid not involve
telephone numbers) and, in dicta, discussed telephone numbers, stating that: "for
a business,. . . telephone numbers constitute a unique property interest, the value
of which increases as the number becomes known through publication in
guidebooks, posting on billboards, and imprinting on publicity items." 3 2 The
Umbro court honed in on this language, quoted it, and concluded that the Fifth
Circuit generally recognizes property interests in telephone numbers' 33 By failing
to examine the exact nature of this Fifth Circuit precedent the Umbro court

130 Id
. JOHN LOCKE, TWOTREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.

Press 1967) (1690).
13 Ga. Power Co. v. Sec. Inv. Props., Inc., 559 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1977).
1 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80,87, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738,
1744 (5th Cir. 2000).
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overlooked the subtleties apparent in Fontainebleau. Contrary to Umbro's
assessment, it is not at all clear that a Fifth Circuit court would find a possessory
property interest in telephone numbers unless the three justifications found in
Fontainebleauare satisfied.
B. POSSESSORY PROPERTY INTERESTS IN TELEPHONE NUMBERS IN THE FIRST
CIRCUIT

The Umbro court indicated that the First Circuit was another jurisdiction that
distinguished between telephone numbers and the services contracted for with the
telephone company. 34 In reaching this conclusion, the Umbro decision merely
cited Darman v. Metropolitan Alarm Corporation,3 ' a First Circuit case which the
court summarized by saying it had "approv[ed] [the] sale of telephone numbers
in order to increase value of [the] bankruptcy estate and not[ed] [the] distinction
between 'a subscriber's rights derived from a contract for telephone service and
a subscriber's possible claim to a possessory interest in the telephone
number.' 136 As with its assessment of Fifth Circuit precedent, the Umbro court
failed to explore the subtleties of Darman.
Like Security Investment and Fontainebleau, Darman involved a Chapter 11
reorganization bankruptcy.1 7 The controversy in the case arose from the debtor's
desire for a bankruptcy court order confirming the sale of two phone numbers,
which apparently had value because they had been listed in the directory under a
valuable trade name. 3 ' Thus, as in Fontainebleau,the Darmancourt had to grapple
with whether the debtor had sufficient possession of a phone number to give the
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over it. 39 The similarities between Darman and
Fontainebleauend there. In Fontainebleau,the telephone company itself challenged
the bankruptcy court's assertion of jurisdiction."
In Darman, however, the
telephone company actually consented to the sale of the numbers.' Thus, while
the Virginia Supreme Court concluded from Darman that the First Circuit is one
of two jurisdictions to recognize a property interest in telephone numbers, the
Daman holding is probably limited to cases in which the telephone company

I Id at 87.

135 528 F.2d 908 (1st Cir. 1976).
136 Umbro, 529

S.E.2d at 87 (quoting Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 9 10 (1st Cir.

1976)).
137Darman,528 F.2d at 910.
138

Id

139 md
'o

In reFontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).

141 Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 910 (1st Cir. 1976).
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consents to the sale or assignment of the telephone numbers. Indeed, Darman
contains a footnote stating:
There appears to be a conflict of authority on whether in the
absence of telephone company consent a bankrupt subscriber has
an interest such as to give the bankruptcy court summary jurisdiction. [citations omitted] However, as the telephone company has
acquiesced in the bankruptcy court's order, we need not rule on that
question. 4"
Hence, the Umbro court overlooked the subtleties of both the First and Fifth
Circuit approaches to telephone numbers as property interests and misconstrued
both Security Investment and Darmanas setting forth a blanket rule that a telephone
number can be treated as an asset of a debtor.
C. THE TELEPHONE NUMBER/DOMAIN NAME ANALOGY AND THE APPLICABILITY OF FIFTH AND FIRST CIRCUIT PRECEDENT TO DOMAIN NAMES

This analysis has heretofore explored the accuracy of the Umbro court's
conclusion that two jurisdictions have recognized a distinction between a debtor's
interest in receiving telephone services and an interest in the telephone number
itself. As previously indicated, the Umbrv court was rather imprecise in holding
that a blanket rule exists in either the Fifth or First Circuit; indeed, definite
limitations have been placed on the recognition of possessory property interests
in telephone numbers in both jurisdictions. Still, Daman and Security Investment
both indicate that the First and Fifth Circuits and, by implication, the Eleventh
Circuit, are willing to recognize a property interest in telephone numbers when
those limitations are met. Thus, those jurisdictions might also recognize a
property interest in domain names ifdomain names were found to be sufficiently
analogous to telephone numbers. Accordingly, this section addresses the
telephone number/domain name analogy, first in general terms and then within
the context of the reasoning underlying Darman and Fontainebeau.
A number of commentators have discussed the strong similarities between
domain names and telephone numbers, 143 and this comparison has been
Jd at 911 n.2.
e.g.,
HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH E. POWERS, IP STRATEGY: COMPLETE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/PLANNING, ACCESS AND PROTECTION § 1(V)(B) (2002) (stating that
the "owner" of a domain name or telephone number only has a property interest in the value he has
added to the name or number by "exploiting" it); Anne Hiaring, Basic Prinples of Trademark Law, in
UNDERSTANDING BASICTRADEMARKLAW 2002 at 7,14 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Handbook Series No. 713,July-Aug. 2002) (arguing "domain names are similar to
142

143 See,
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addressed to several courts with varying levels of success.' 44 Determining the
accuracy of the telephone number/domain name analogy begins with considering
the respective technological functions served by each. Of course, in this respect
the two are remarkably similar. A telephone caller dials a telephone number so
that a number of electronic switches can then route the call to the appropriate
destination. 4 ' Similarly, when an Internet user enters a domain name, the user's
networked computer begins receiving information from the computer whose IP
address corresponds to the domain name entered by the user.' 46 Domain names,
however, require an extra step for which there is no equivalent when one dials a
telephone number. Networked computers do not identify other computers by the
domain names that people use.'47 Instead, the domain names must be converted
to IP address numbers, by means of the Domain Name System, which the user's
computer then utilizes to locate the accessed computer. 4 '
While the one-step removed nature of domain names does not alter their
functional equivalence to telephone numbers, it does affect the potential value of
domain names, which in turn prevents the domain name/telephone number
analogy from being an "all-fours" analogy. As opposed to most phone numbers,
domain names can have inherent value. For example, as already mentioned,
9
names like "wallstreet.com" and "beauty.cc" have sold for $1 million or more."
Such generic domain names have value primarily because they consist of easily
remembered words; in fact, the Domain Name System exists solely because users
can remember words better than numbers.'s Likewise, a non-generic domain
name containing a business' name also can have a value that is derived from the

telephone number mnemonics, but they are of greater importance, since there is no satisfactory
Internet equivalent to a telephone company white pages or directory assistance, and domain names
can often be guessed").
'" E.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-585 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding it "unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words
now"); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325,46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511, 1519
(9th Cir. 1998) ("A domain name is similar to a 'vanity number' that identifies its source."); Sallen

v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14,19,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941, 1944 (1st Cir.
1991) (noting that a domain name "functions much like a telephone number"); Dorer v. Arel, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("A judgment debtor 'owns' the domain name registration in the
same way that a person 'owns' a telephone number."); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957-58, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1872 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (comparing
"[v]anity telephone numbers" with domain names).
"s Tehphone, athttp://www.infoplease.com/ce6/sci/A848085.html (last visited Sept. 3,2003).
Seegeneral4 supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
AricJacover, I Want myMP3! GratingaLegaland
PracticalScbemeto Combat CopyngbtInfingement
on Peer-to-PeerInternetApp'cationt, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207, 2213 (2002).
'46

147

"4

Id

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
"o Cohen & Laue, supra note 3, at 425.

149
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value of the mark encapsulated in the domain name; this is the motive belying
cybersquatting.
On the other hand, telephone numbers ordinarily consist only of a series of
numbers that appear random to the user and are therefore easy to forget and of
little value (in and of themselves) to the individuals to whom they are assigned.
These numbers, like the numbers in Fontainebleauand Darman,acquire value only
because of advertising and publicity. An exception exists, however, with respect
to mnemonic telephone numbers. Consider, for example, telephone numbers like
1-800-COLLECT and 1-800-CALL-ATT. Such numbers are more easily
remembered than numeric telephone numbers and, hence, more valuable to the
holder of the number. Thus, the domain name/telephone number analogy is
strongest with respect to mnemonic telephone numbers. Still, as one commentator has observed, "domain names are similar to telephone number mnemonics,
but they are of greater importance, since there is no satisfactory Internet
equivalent to a telephone company white pages or directory assistance, and
domain names can often be guessed.""'1
A second factor preventing the domain name/telephone number analogy from
being an "all-fours" analogy involves the different nature of the services offered
by domain name registrars and telephone companies. As discussed, computers
actually access information from other connected computers by identifying other
computers by their IP addresses. s2 Thus, an arguably strong similarity exists
between a caller dialing the number of the party with whom she wishes to speak
and a computer accessing another computer using its IP address. However, one
must note an important distinction-a website's IP address is not assigned by the
domain name registrar in the same way that a telephone number is assigned by a
telephone company. "[Tihe IP address is assigned by an Internet Service Provider
(ISP), such as AOL or Earthlink."' 3 The ISP is also responsible, unlike the
domain name registrar, for connecting the computer to the Internet." Thus, an
ISP is more similar to a telephone company than a domain name registrar for two
reasons. First, a telephone company connects a user's telephone to an interconnected system of other telephones in the same way that an ISP connects a user's
computer to the Internet. Second, a telephone company provides a user with a
telephone number just as an ISP provides a user with a numeric IP address.

151Hiaring, supranote 143, at 14.
IS2 Cohen

& Laue, supra note 3, at 425.

's Carole Levitt & Mark Rosch, Protecting Your Pnivag on the Internet: Use of the Internet Means
Exchanging Data hetween Your Computer and Other Computers, 25 L.A. LAW. 75, 75 (Nov. 2002).
"s'Shaun P. Montana,An Approach to the International Regulatogy Issues of IP Tephony, 8 B.U.J. Sci.

& TECH. L. 682, 684 (2002).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss1/11

24

Blackerby: Flat Broke and Busted, But Can I Keep My Domain Name? Domain Name

2003]

FLAT BROKE AND BUSTED

Thus, an IP address/telephone number analogy is more apt than a domain
name/telephone number analogy.
Given the preceding explanation of functional roles, domain name registrars
clearly are inessential to the functionality of the Internet. Users could access
other computers solely bymeans of numeric IP addresses just as telephone callers
call others solely by means of a numeric sequence. The role that a domain name
registrar plays in the process is thus a third party role for which there is no exact
equivalent in the context of telephone numbers. The only way to imagine
something truly analogous to a domain name registrar with respect to telephone
numbers is to imagine a business, separate from a phone company, that could
provide telephone users with the ability to dial other users using word signals
which correspond to specific telephone numbers. Consequently, the domain
name/telephone number analogy is flawed by the unique nature of the services
provided by a domain name registrar and the inherent value that many domain
names can have due to their alpha-numeric (rather than solely numeric) form.
Still, domain names and telephone numbers perform essentially the same function
for users-each allows the user to specify and access another user.
Considering these similarities and dissimilarities, it would be an overly
simplistic approach to ask merely whether the analogy is strong enough for a
court applying Fontainebleauor Darman to find that domain names, like telephone
numbers, are subject to possessory property interests. Instead, Darman's and
Fontainebleau'sjustifications for finding property interests in telephone numbers
must be carefully applied to the unique features of domain names to determine
if the particular rationales of the two cases would be fulfilled by also holding that
domain names are subject to property interests.
The Fontainebkauopinion focused on three distinct factors favoring a finding
that the hotel had a possessory property interest in its telephone numbers. The
first was the hotel's right to use the telephone numbers at the time of the hotel's
bankruptcy filing.'
This factor arguably favors finding a property interest in
domain names more so than with respect to telephone numbers. Clearly, holders
of both telephone numbers and domain names have a right to distribute and use
them in advertising so long as that use does not infringe upon another's
protectable mark.' 6 A domain name registrant arguably has a stronger right to

t's In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975).
156 See 800 Spirits Inc. v. Liquor By Wire, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 675,680 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting the
inability of a party to prevent use of a telephone number even if it is a generic mnemonic telephone
number (for example, 1-800-SPIRITS)); but see also Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 278, 294, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that where the
mnemonic portion of the number contained a descriptive term that had acquired secondary meaning,
it had become a protectable mark and could only be used by the party having a protectable interest
in the mark). See also Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 252, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
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use a domain name than the holder of a telephone number though. In particular,
the sole purpose underlying one's decision to register a domain name is to acquire
the right to use it or exclude others from using it. On the other hand, one does
not normally enter into a service agreement with a telephone company solely to
acquire the right to use a telephone number; the telephone service subscriber is
more interested in the telephone company maintaining a connection to the
subscriber's phone. The telephone number is merely incidental to the other
services provided. A telephone service subscriber is seeking the type of service
supplied by an ISP, not a domain name registrar. Hence, even though both a
telephone service subscriber and a domain name registrant have a right to use his
respective name or number, the domain name registrant has a superior interest
in protecting his right of use because he sought out a registrar and contracted for
the use of a specific name. In contrast, the telephone service subscriber's receipt
of a telephone number is only incidental to the other contracted services.
Furthermore, the domain registrant normally has paid in advance for the right
to use the name for a specified period of time and has a reasonable expectation
that he will be allowed to use it for the duration of the contract period."5 7 If the
registrar interferes with the registrant's right of use, the registrar will have arguably
A telephone subscriber, on the other hand,
breached a contractual duty.'
normally pays month to month and has no expectation that he will be allowed to
retain the number for any definite amount of time. The subscriber should
reasonably expect to lose the number for any number of reasons, including9
missed payments, moving, or even the periodic addition of new area codes. 5
The first Fontainebleaufactor, therefore, weighs more heavily in support of finding
a property interest in domain names than in telephone numbers.
The second identified justification underlying the Fontainebleauholding was the
guiding purpose of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy-protecting the debtor's means of
maintaining the business."6 This appears to place a severe limitation on the
number of situations in which a court following the case might find a property
interest in a domain name. The importance of this factor to the holding of

(BNA) 1248, 1250 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that one can acquire the right to use a domain name by
registering it with a registrar on a first-come first-served basis); but see general#y Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) (greatly limiting the ability of a party to
register, use or sell a domain name that is or contains a protected mark).
157 See VeriSign, supranote 62 (explaining the basic terms of the VeriSign registration agreement).
158 See, e.g., Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001) (illustrating a suit
brought by a registrant against a registrar for breach of the registration service agreement, but
dismissed due to the enforceability of a forum selection clause).
1s9 See Wendy Tanaka, Two More Area Codes Picked for Southeastern Pa., at http://areacodeinfo.com/headline/2000/pa000510.htm (May 10, 2000).
"o In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Fontainebleauseems to indicate that even if a court chose to apply the case to
domain names, then a property interest could be found only if the proceeding
were a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The nature of the registration process, however,
makes it difficult to even imagine a situation in which a Chapter 11 debtor might
need to seek assistance from the bankruptcy court to protect continued use of a
domain name.
The property status of telephone numbers was at issue in Fontainebleaubecause
the hotel had fallen into arrears in making its payments to the telephone company,
and the utility threatened to replace the numbers. One should recall, however,
that a domain name registrant usually, at least in the case of VeriSign and formerly
NSI, pays in advance for the right to use the name for a specified period of
time.' 6' On the other hand, when receiving telephone service, the subscriber
typically pays at the end of each billing period for charges incurred. Based on this
distinction regarding time of payment, it seems doubtful that another Fontainebleau
situation could occur with respect to domain names.
Still, the issue of the property status of a domain name could arise in a Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceeding. For example, the traditional method of payment in
the domain name process could become more similar to the method of payment
for telephone service. Another example is suggested by Darman,a case where a
Chapter 11 debtor had a phone number that derived value from the trade name
under which it was listed. 6 ' The debtor, therefore, wanted to sell the number to
a third party as part of its Chapter 11 reorganization plan.' 63 Considering the high
price tags that some domain names have garnered, a bankrupt business, like the
Darman debtor, might want to sell a valuable domain name to a third party to help
rejuvenate its business. Based on the high values of domain names, Chapter 11
sales of domain names probably will become (if not already) far more commonplace than similar sales of telephone numbers. In these Chapter 11 sales, the
domain names often would be a valuable asset to the debtor's estate; therefore,
the Fontainebleauconcern for furthering the purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcies
would be fulfilled.
Strict application of this second factor, however, could produce anomalous
results. Consider, for example, the possibility that a non-debtor would be denied
the opportunity to sell a domain name (assuming that some party, presumably the
registrar, objected to the sale) while a Chapter 11 debtor couldsell a domain name.
Having a rule that determines whether a property interest exists not based on the

161See, e.g., VeriSign, supra note 62 (advertising that domain names can be registered for $35 for
the first year and $20 for each succeeding year).
162Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 910 (1st Cir. 1976).
163
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intrinsic qualities of the intangible at issue but, rather, on the financial condition
of the alleged owner certainly would seem odd.
Two methods exist by which this intellectual conundrum may be avoided.
First, the Chapter 11 factor could simply be dropped from consideration in
connection with this issue. Alternatively, the matter could be addressed by statute
and the property interest terminology dropped. In other words, if the court's
reason for holding that a property interest exists is merely that the "owner" is a
Chapter 11 debtor, then the court apparently has greater concern for protecting
the debtor than with establishing a well-reasoned rule with respect to the nature
of domain names. In that situation, the Bankruptcy Code and state exemption
laws should be amended to protect a debtor's use of a domain name and
telephone number so that courts can avoid using a legal fiction of property
interests to achieve that same end.
The third factor considered by the Fontainebleaucourt is what this Note has
identified as a labor theory approach to telephone number property interests. In
Fontainebleau,the court emphasized that the hotel had "invested substantial sums
inadvertising that list[ed] the numbers."''" In turn, the court said this meant that
the numbers had acquired value and that keeping the numbers was important to
the hotel.'
Thus, the court seemed concerned with protecting the value added
to the numbers by virtue of the hotel's advertising; acknowledging a property
interest in the telephone numbers allowed for the recognition of a legally
protectable interest in the value added by the advertising. By the same token, it
seems less clear that the court would have recognized a property interest had the
hotel not expended time and energy in publicizing the numbers. Nevertheless,
the court probably would never have to consider that issue since a phone number
which has not been publicized has no value, and hence, no one will likely seek to
protect it.

Unfortunately, this labor theory approach is not so easily applied to domain
names because of the inherent differences between domain names and telephone
numbers. Specifically, while energy normally must be expended to give value to
telephone numbers, domain names can have inherent financial value, particularly
in the case of generic names." Thus, unlike telephone numbers, domain names
can have value without ever having been used. Therefore, recognizing a property
interest in an unused generic domain name would not protect any value added by
means of the registrant's labors; the only labor involved in acquiring a valuable
domain name is being the first to register.16' This is not to say, however, that

'

In reFontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056, 1058 (5th Cit. 1975).

165 Id
16

Harroch, smpra note 31, at 548.
S67
See Nguyen, rupra note 34, at 976 (suggesting that the registrant of a generic domain name
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domain names can never acquire value due to the registrant's efforts. For
example, a domain name containing all or part of a protectable mark has value
derived from the value of the mark. Those marks need not be addressed here or
by the courts in considering property interests in domain names because the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act extended trademark protection to
those names.'
Therefore, applying the Fontainebleaulabor theory approach to domain names
leads to the conclusion that unused generic names would not be subject to a
possessory property interest. Moreover, those names containing protectable
marks would not be subject to a Fontainebleauanalysis because they are already
protected by the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. This leaves a
narrow spectrum of domain name registrants that might benefit under a labor
theory approach to domain name property interests. That spectrum contains only
registrants who have registered a non-mark-protected name and have used or
publicized it enough to increase its value but have not sufficiently used it to make
it a protected mark. In other words, the name must have been used and identified
with a particular business without actually containing the trademark-protected
name of that business. Surprisingly, relatively few such domain names seem to
be in use. Instead, many registrants of generic domain names have also used their
domain names as the names of their businesses, thereby possibly making them
protectable marks.'69 Therefore, even if a court applied Fontainebleauto domain
names, strict application of the case's principles would lead to a recognition of a
property interest in a very small number of domain names.
Applying Fontainebleau to domain names raises many complex issues, but
applying Darman is a far more straightforward matter. As noted, the court in
Darmanrested its holding that the Chapter 11 debtor could transfer a telephone
number to a third party on the single fact that the telephone company "entered
into a stipulation with the trustee in bankruptcy expressly agreeing that the trustee
could transfer all benefits of the advertising and listings and the use of the
numbers to the third party in question."' 70 Therefore, a court applying Darman
to domain names should have no problem concluding that a registrant may treat
its domain name as separate from its services contract with the registrar so long
as the registrar has consented to allow the registrant to freely assign and sell the
domain name. Such consent seems unlikely, however. For example, the dispute
in Umbro would not have arisen had NSI agreed to a judicial sale of Tombas'

gains an unfair competitive advantage merely by registering).
168 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
169 See, e.g., "http://www.shoes.com:"' http://www.t-shirts.com," and "http://www.hats.com"
(all of which double as a trade name and the company's domain name).
170 Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 910 (1st Cir. 1976).
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domain names.' 7 1 More notably, in the wake of Umbro, VeriSign now expressly
states that it does not consent to the assignability of domain names in the
registration agreement. The agreement makes this rather clear, saying:
Except as otherwise set forth herein, your rights under this
Agreement are not assignable or transferable. Any attempt by your
creditors to obtain an interest in your rights under this Agreement,
whether by attachment, levy, garnishment or otherwise, renders this
Agreement voidable at our option. You agree not to resell any72of
the Services without VeriSign's prior express written consent.
While it is unknown how many of the more than one hundred ICANNaccredited domain name registrars have similar provisions in their service
agreements, the existence of such provisions would certainly prevent application
of Darman. Therefore, if non-assignability provisions are widespread among other
registrars, Darman would have virtually no applicability to domain names.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, Umbro's appraisals of both Security Investment and Darman are
deficient. In its analysis of Security Investment, the Umbro court honed in on dicta
in the case to conclude that the Fifth Circuit recognized property interests in
telephone numbers. Moreover, Umbr presented its discussion of Security
Investment so as to indicate that the Fifth Circuit had established a blanket rule on
the issue.' Thus, Umbro's assessment of the Fifth Circuit approach is lacking for
two reasons. First, Security Investment did not involve telephone numbers; thus, the
Umbro court should have directed its attention to Fontainebleau. 4 Second, with
Fontainebleau, the Fifth Circuit did not establish a blanket rule that a telephone
service subscriber always has an interest in his telephone number. Rather, the
Fontainebleaucourt recognized a property interest in a telephone number based on
three factors that the court noted in the case. First, the holder of the number had
a right to use it.' Second, the general purpose of Chapter 11 bankruptcies was
satisfied by recognizing a property interest in the telephone numbers since

' Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738,

1739 (Va. 2000).
172VerisignServiceAgreement,120,athttp://www.networksolutions.com/en-US/lega/staticservice-agreement.jhtml (last visited Sept. 5, 2003).
11 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 87, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738,
1744 (Va. 2000).
1 In re Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975).
175 Id at 1059.
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retention of the numbers would help preserve the wherewithal of the debtor's
business.'76 Third, the debtor had expended money to give the numbers added
value, which the court sought to protect by adopting a labor theory approach.' 77
If a Fifth or Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals strictly applied the Fontainebleau
factors to domain names, it would likely find a property interest in a given domain
name only in limited situations. The registrant would be required to have a right
to use the name under the terms of the registration agreement; the registrant
would have to be a Chapter 11 debtor, and the registrant must have used the
domain name so as to add value to its inherent worth. Of course, this prediction
presupposes that the court would find the domain name/telephone number
analogy sufficiently strong to apply Fontainebleauand that the court would strictly
adhere to the factors relied upon in the opinion.
Finally, contrary to the Umbro court's assessment, the First Circuit has not
adopted a blanket rule that a property interest can exist in a telephone number.
Rather, in Darman,which Umbro cited, the First Circuit only held that a debtor
could sell the right to use a telephone number when the telephone company
consented to the sale, and the court explicitly limited its holding to this extent.'78
STEVEN BLACKERBY

176

Id.

Id at 1058.
178 Darman v. Metro. Alarm Corp., 528 F.2d 908, 911 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976).
'77
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